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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
To the extent necessary, The Flood Co. adopts its "Statement Showing 
Jurisdiction of Appellate Court," as found in its "Brief of the Appellant," page 6. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
To the extent necessary, The Flood Co. adopts its "Statement of the Issues," 
as found in its "Brief of the Appellant," pages 6-9. 
Issue Relating to Timberline's Cross-Appeal: Timberings statement of the 
issue of its cross-appeal is as follows: "Did the trial court err in failing to award 
Timberline Properties its attorneys7 fees pursuant to Utah Code § 38-1-18 as the 
"Successful Party" on All Clean's Mechanics7 Lien Claim?" Brief of Appellees and 
Cross-Appellants, pg. 1. 
Standard of Review and Supporting Authority: To the extent that this issue 
involves a question of statutory interpretation, this Court reviews for correctness. 
Hutter v. Dig-It, lnc.r 2009 UT 69, %8,219 P.3d 918. While a trial court does not 
have discretion in determining whether to award fees under Section 38-1-3 to the 
"successful party," there appears to be some discretion in the determination of 
"successful party" status. See A.K. & R. Wlripple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2004 
UT 47, f 25,94 P.3d 270. 
Citation to the Record Showing that the Issue was Preserved in the Trial 
6 
Court: Timberline states that 'The issue of attorneys' fees under section 38-1-18 
was addressed in closing arguments at trial/7 Brief of Appellees and Cross-
Appellants, pg. 2 (referencing R. at 295, pgs. 85-86). The referenced record 
citation, however, only refers to the request made by The Flood Co. at trial for an 
award of attorneys fees. Timberline also implies that the trial court found that it 
was the "successful party" on the mechanic's lien claim, but no such finding was 
made by the trial court and Timberline never requested such a finding. (R. at 
241-47). The trial record is devoid of any request by Timberline for an award of 
attorneys fees, and the trial court therefore had no occasion to determine whether 
Timberline was entitled to "successful party" status. 
Accordingly, this issue was not preserved by Timberline in the trial court. 
The brief of the appellant "shall contain . . . a statement of the issues presented for 
review . . . and citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved 
in the trial court." Ut. R. App. P. 24(a)(5) (emphasis added). 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11,10 P.3d 346 (citing cases). 
"The preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, 
unless [the appellant] can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 
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'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11,10 P.3d 346 (citing cases). 
Where an appellant fails to provide a "statement of grounds for seeking review 
of an issue not preserved in the trial court," which statement would identify and 
substantiate an exception to the preservation rule, an appellate court properly 
declines to address the merits of any possible exception. State v. Rhinehart, 2007 
UT 61, % 21,167 R3d 1046. In addition, potential exceptions to the preservation 
rule may not be argued for the first time in a reply brief. Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 
UT 98,1ft 7-9,17 R3d 1122. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The statutes which are determinative or of central importance to this 
appeal are Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-3 (2009) and Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1) 
(2009), attached to The Flood Co/s "Brief of the Appellant" as Addendum, 
Exhibit F. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
To the extent necessary, The Flood Co. adopts its "Statement of the Case," 
as found in its "Brief of the Appellant," pages 9-30. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issue of whether the trial court incorrectly concluded that The Flood 
Co. was not entitled to a mechanic's lien is not precluded under the "acceptance 
of the benefits" doctrine, as the mechanic's lien claim and the unjust enrichment 
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claim are separate and distinct. When The Flood Co. accepted the judgment in its 
favor on the unjust enrichment claim, the issues relating to the mechanic's lien 
claim did not become moot. The controversy remained alive because there is no 
overlap between the relevant issues on appeal and the issues determined by the 
trial court in relation to the unjust enrichment claim. 
Timberline's interpretation and application of Section 38-1-3 is 
unreasonable and in conflict with the mechanic's lien statute and its stated 
objective. The interpretation proposed by The Flood Co. gives due deference to 
the language, grammar, and punctuation used in the statute and is in harmony 
with its legislative history, producing a result which comports with the objective 
of the mechanic's lien statute. The trial court found that The Flood Co/s work 
was necessary to make Timberline's property habitable and the trial court 
believed that The Flood Co/s work enhanced the value of Timberline's property. 
Having so found, the trial court should have concluded that The Flood Co. was 
entitled to a mechanic's lien, and an accompanying award of attorneys fees in 
foreclosing the lien. 
Finally, Timberline is precluded from seeking an award of attorneys fees 
on appeal because it failed to preserve that issue in the trial court below. In 
addition, Timberline is precluded from an award of attorneys fees because it was 
9 
not the successful party below. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
L THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BENEFIT DOCTRINE DOES NOT 
IMPAIR THE APPEAL IN THIS CASE. 
This case would not even be before this Court except that Timberline 
accepted insurance money but did not pay the insurance money over to The 
Flood Co. Timberline's acceptance of the benefit argument seems a disingenuous 
attempt to avoid having The Flood Co/s claim for attorney's fees heard rather 
than deal with the merits. 
Timberline cites many cases dealing with the acceptance of the benefit 
doctrine, but ignores one important case from this Court. In Richards v. Brown, 
there was payment of the judgment and the payment was acknowledged, but 
there was no satisfaction of judgment executed, just as The Flood Co. has not 
executed a satisfaction of judgment in this case. 2009 UT App 315,222 P.3d 69. 
This Court rejected the acceptance of the benefit doctrine argument made by 
Richards because Brown had not executed a satisfaction of judgment: "We reject 
Brown's argument because although Richards does not dispute that he received 
payment, there is no satisfaction of judgment in the record/' Id. at f^ 8. Because 
there was no satisfaction of judgment executed in this case, Timberline's 
argument ought to be similarly rejected. 
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Assuming arguendo that this Court is inclined to still consider the 
acceptance of the benefit doctrine, Timberline misapplies the "separate and 
distinct" exception to the acceptance of the benefit doctrine in concluding that 
acceptance of payment on the unjust enrichment claim precludes The Flood Co. 
from appealing the trial court's ruling on its mechanic's lien claim. A claim is 
"separate and distinct" when the necessary elements of that claim do not overlap 
with the elements of the claim as to which payment was accepted. 
Some of the stated purposes of the acceptance of the benefit doctrine are to 
avoid court discussion of moot issues and to require an appealing party to act in 
accordance with its contention or be deemed to have waived an appeal or be 
estopped from appealing. Cingolani v. Ut. Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219,1221 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). An issue is moot "[i]f the requested judicial relief cannot 
affect the rights of the litigants." Cingolani, 790 R2d at 1222 (citing cases). 
As stated by the Jensen Court, however, "pertinent to the problem here is 
an ancient aphorism: 'If the reason for the rule is not present, the rule does not 
apply/" Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142,1143 (Utah 1973). The reason for the rule is 
not present if an appeal is "as to separate and independent claims where the 
controversy has not so come to rest." Id; Rawlings v. Gilt Edge Flour Mills, Inc., 
Case No. 1:07CV31DAK, at *4,2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17848. If an appealed claim 
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is separate and distinct from the resolved claim, the issues of mootness, waiver, 
or estoppel have no bearing. Accordingly, the Jensen Court noted that when a 
separate and distinct controversy remains, the disposition of the claim on appeal 
"cannot affect the disposition of the [resolved claim]/' Jensen, 514 P.2d at 1143. 
An appealed claim is separate and distinct from a resolved claim when the 
issues pertinent to the appealed claim were not dealt with in the trial court's 
disposition of the resolved claim. See Jacobsen v. St Joseph High Sch. Bd., 794 P.2d 
505,506-07 (Utah Ct App. 1990); see also Jensen, 514 P.2d at 1143 (holding that 
"the parts of the judgment on which the defendants claim the plaintiffs accepted 
payment are separate and distinct from the cause of action which is the main 
subject of the plaintiffs' appeal/'). 
In Jacobsen, plaintiff/appellee contractor sued defendant/appellant school 
board for a balance due on a construction contract. The school board 
counterclaimed for cost overruns and damages resulting from delays. 794 P.2d at 
506. These claims for relief all dealt with the contract between the parties. 
Judgment was granted for the contractor, and the school board paid the 
judgment. Id. The school board then appealed, alleging error in two aspects of 
the trial court's jury instructions and in the denial of its counterclaim for cost 
overruns and damages resulting from delays. Id. at 507. 
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This Court held that the school's claims on appeal were not separate and 
distinct from the contractor's breach of contract claim because "the counterclaim 
was neither separate and distinct, nor independent of the case-in-chief, but so 
'interwoven' with it that it could not intelligently be separated." Id. Likewise, 
the challenge to the jury instructions was "encompassed by the jury verdict." Id. 
The issues raised in the school board's appeal were issues which the trial court 
necessarily found in favor of the contractor and against the school board when it 
granted judgment for the contractor on its claim for breach of contract The 
school board acquiesced in the resolution of those issues by paying the judgment 
on the claim for breach of contract. 
There is no such overlap here between the issues on appeal (the meaning 
and applicability of the mechanic's lien statute) and the issues dealt with by the 
trial court in its resolution of the unjust enrichment claim. A claim for unjust 
enrichment involves the following issues: 1) the conferral of a benefit, 2) the 
conferee being aware of the benefit, and 3) retention of the benefit under 
circumstances which make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit 
without making payment. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1247-1248 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting cases). The trial court's resolution of these issues did not relate to the 
issues before this Court on appeal. On appeal, this Court must determine 
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whether the trial court was incorrect in holding that "the work done by plaintiff 
is not of the type which entitles plaintiff to have a lien upon the property of 
defendants/7 (R. at 269). That determination requires this Court to determine the 
meaning and application of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3. There is no overlap 
between the issues on appeal and the resolved unjust enrichment claim. 
While it is true that in an entirely distinct context—that of determining the 
allocation of attorneys fees among successful and unsuccessful claims —a 
mechanic's lien claim has been held to be "inextricably tied" to a breach of 
contract or unjust enrichment claim, Stonecreek Landscaping, LLC v. Bell, 2008 UT 
App 144, f 9, that context has no bearing on the meaning of the separate and 
distinct controversy exception as applied here. Relevant to the allocation of 
attorneys fees is whether attorney time spent on one claim is necessary or 
beneficial to work done on another claim. That inquiry searches for overlap in 
the purpose of an attorney's work. Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT App 335, Tf 12,991 
P.2d 1113. The separate and distinct controversy exception, on the other hand, 
looks to whether there is an overlap of the issues of two claims decided by the 
trial court to determine whether the acceptance or acquiescence of the judgment 
as to one claim caused the controversy as to the other claim to come to rest. 
Timberline argues that these claims are not separate and distinct because 
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"the Court may affirm the trial court's judgment regarding All Clean's 
mechanic's lien claim on alternate grounds that could affect the disposition of the 
trial court's judgment regarding All Clean's unjust enrichment claim." Brief of 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, pg. 12. This argument misconstrues both the 
"affirm on any ground" rule and the separate and distinct controversy exception. 
Notably, it is a strange idea to affirm one aspect of a trial court's judgment 
by overturning another aspect of the trial court's judgment.1 This certainly is not 
the accepted application of the "affirm on any ground" rule.2 More significantly, 
the "affirm on any ground" exists against the backdrop that a party must "cross-
appeal or cross-petition if they wish to attack a judgment of a lower court for the 
purpose of enlarging their own rights or lessening the rights of their opponent." 
State v. Coble, 2010 UT App 98, f 11,232 P.3d 538.3 Cross-appeal is the way to 
1 The fact that this is theoretically possible here strongly suggests that the unjust 
enrichment claim and mechanic's lien claim are indeed separate and distinct. 
2 See Bailey v. Baylesf 2002 UT 58, \ 13 n.3,52 P.3d 1158 ("While we acknowledge 
the existence and validity of the 'affirm on any ground' rule of appellate review, 
we caution that it is a tool available only in limited circumstances,, It certainly is 
limited to affirming decisions on alternate grounds and does not give appellate 
courts permission to search the record for alternate grounds to reverse a 
decision.") (citing Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222,225-26 
n.2,461 P.2d 290,293 n.2 (1969)). 
3 That the affirm on any ground rule does not operate in relation to the 
acceptance of the benefits doctrine as suggested by Timberline is seen in Rawlings 
v. Gilt Edge Flour Mills, Inc., Case No. 1:07CV31DAK, at *4,2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
17848, where the United States District Court for the District of Utah held that a 
party who is successful on a claim but is denied attorneys fees may accept 
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attack the judgment on the unjust enrichment claim, and even that remedy is 
only available as to issues actually raised before the trial court.4 
Timberline's assertion that a shift in the burden of risk has occurred 
because of Timberline's payment also fails on this point, as the only way 
Timberline could be forced to recover from The Flood Co. is if Timberline's rights 
were enlarged as appellee. To be sure, this "burden of risk" principle only 
justifies the acceptance of the benefits doctrine where there is not a separate and 
distinct controversy. Otherwise, there could be no exception, for the fact that the 
appealing party had already received payment would always prejudice the 
respondent and help the appealing party fund its appeal.5 
Timberline's assertion as to the acceptance of the benefit doctrine is 
misplaced. The Flood Co. did not relinquish its mechanic's lien claim for 
attorneys fees or cause that claim to become moot by accepting payment on the 
payment on the successful claim without prejudicing the right to appeal the 
denial of attorneys fees. 
4 As a result, Timberline cannot ignore at trial the issue of whether The Flood Co. 
presented evidence that it was properly licensed (particularly where the public 
record indicates it is) and then raise the issue on appeal. 
5 There is likewise no merit to the contention that Timberline was unjustifiably 
prejudiced because it had to escrow funds in relation to the sale of real property 
to which the judgment had attached. As Timberline, concedes, The Flood Co. 
could not execute a satisfaction of judgment without prejudicing the right to 
appeal. The Flood Co. did not execute a satisfaction of judgment and the 
controversy as to the mechanic's lien claim remains alive. 
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unjust enrichment claim. The controversy is as alive as it ever was. 
II. UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 38-1-3, THE FLOOD 
CO. IS ENTITLED TO A MECHANIC'S LIEN. 
Timberline initially acknowledges that the "mechanics' lien statutes are 
remedial in nature and consequently should be liberally construed," but argues 
that the statute should nevertheless be narrowly construed in determining 
whether a lien attaches. Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants, pgs. 19-21. The 
only cited support for such a proposition comes from foreign jurisdictions and 
appears to be based upon the premise that statutes that create rights in 
derogation of common law should be narrowly construed. Id. 
Timberline ignores Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2(1), which provides that "The 
rule of the common law that a statute in derogation of the common law is to be 
strictly construed does not apply to the Utah Code." The rule which does apply 
is that "Each provision of, and each proceeding under, the Utah Code shall be 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the provision and to promote 
justice." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2(3). As acknowledged by Timberline, the 
mechanic's lien statute is remedial in nature and consequently should be liberally 
construed so as to protect those who have "added directly to the value of the 
property of another by their materials or labor." Calder Bros Co. v. Anderson, 652 
P.2d 922,924 (Utah 1982) (citing cases). 
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Timberings misplaced focus on foreign law continues in its analysis of the 
word "improvement/7 to the detriment of the actual language of Section 38-1-3. 
Both parties have attempted to define what "improvement" means for purposes 
of Section 38-1-3. The Flood Co. looks to plain language of the statute, including 
its phrasing and punctuation. Timberline, in contrast, argues that 
"improvement" is a term of art. But this argument is supported only by citation 
to foreign law, in complete disregard of the language of Section 38-1-3. On this 
foundation, Timberline goes on to cite more law from foreign jurisdictions, 
Barron's Law Dictionary, and other secondary sources for the proposition that 
"improvement" — as it occurs in its first usage in Section 38-1-3 — means 
enhancement of value, but more than mere repairs. 
As to the meaning of "improvement" as it occurs in the second usage in 
Section 38-1-3, Timberline urges that here "the term 'improvement7 is used as a 
noun to connote something physical," like a building or structure. Brief of 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, pg. 24. Timberline's primary support for this 
position is its analysis of "improvement" as used elsewhere it Title 38, but as will 
be shown hereafter, the other occurrences of "improvement" actually work 
against Timberline's interpretation. 
Based on the foregoing, Timberline concludes that the legislature really 
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meant that a lien is appropriate where a contractor makes an improvement (the 
act or process of improving) to an improvement (something physical like a 
building or structure). Timberline's interpretation, however, lacks foundation in 
the language of the statute and disregards Utah case law. 
The language of the statute itself reveals the errors in Timberline's 
interpretation. Section 38-1-3 is written to include materials or services "used in 
the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or 
improvement to any premises in any manner...." (emphasis added). When each 
element of the quoted language is given its due meaning, it is clear that 
Timberline's argument seeks to rewrite the statute based on a spiirit and purpose 
contrary to the rule that the statute is remedial in nature and must be liberally 
interpreted so as to protect those who have added directly to the value of the 
property of another. 
Timberline's rewriting of the statute occurs most blatantly in Timberline's 
reading of the phrase "building or structure or improvement to any premises in 
any manner" in Section 38-1-3. Timberline reads the first part of that phrase as if 
it were written "building, structure, or improvement."6 In so doing, Timberline 
ignores the usage of the word "or" and the absence of commas in this phrase. 
6 This rewriting is implicit in Timberline's construction of Section 38-1-3, Brief of 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, pg. 27; the rewriting is explicit in Timberline's 
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Timberline also ignores that the legislature included the word "to" in the phrase 
"to any premises in any manner." If the legislature had intended that "building," 
"structure," and "improvement" be read synonymously to denote something 
physical, then the legislature would have drafted the phrase as "building, 
structure, or improvement on any premises in any manner." Because the phrase 
includes the words "to any premises in any manner," it should be clear to every 
reader that the word "improvement" is modifying the phrase "to any premises in 
any manner" and cannot be used in the way that Timberline advocates, i.e., as a 
noun denoting a physical object7 
Timberline's reference to "improvement" as used elsewhere in Title 38 
actually detracts from its proposed interpretation. While Timberline cites Section 
38-1-4 for the idea that "improvement" can only be read in connection with 
"building" and "structure," Timberline fails to consider that Section 38-1-4 is 
phrased differently and punctuated differently than Section 38-1-3.8 First, Section 
alternate construction. Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants, pg. 27 n.4. 
7 Examples of physical objects as improvements cited by Timberline are a rock or 
tree. See Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants, pg. 25. Timberline's own 
illustration rebuts its interpretation when its examples are substituted in place of 
"improvement" in the statutory language: "construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or [rock/tree] to any premises in any 
manner." The word "to" would certainly need to be replaced with the word "on" 
in order to facilitate Timberline's interpretation. 
8 The same would apply to Sections 38-1-5 and 38-1-8. 
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38-1-4 lacks the phrase "improvement to any premises in any manner." Just as 
significant, the punctuation of Section 38-1-4 is different, and exactly as 
Timberline would have Section 38-1-3 rewritten to read: "building, structure, or 
improvement." If the legislature had intended that "improvement" be read in 
connection with "building or structure," it would have used punctuation like that 
in Section 38-1-4 and it certainly would not have modified "improvement" with 
the phrase "to any premises in any manner." 
Under the proper interpretation of Section 38-1-3, a lien is appropriate 
where any construction, alteration, or improvement (the act or process of 
improving) has been made to any building or structure or where an 
improvement (the act or process of improving) is made to any premises in any 
manner. 
A. The plain language of the statute, which must be the focus of 
interpretation, identifies two categories of lienable work and ensures 
that one who adds directly to the value of the property of another 
may obtain a lien on the property. 
The most reasonable construction of the statute involves division into two 
categories as suggested by The Flood Co. in its opening brief, i.e., (1) 
construction, alteration, or improvement of buildings or structures, and (2) 
improvement to any premises in any manner. This interpretation is attacked by 
Timberline on several grounds. Timberline argues that The Flood Co/s general 
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dictionary definition for the term "improvement" has been rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Timberline's reference to Frehner v. Morton, 424 P.2d 446 (Utah 
1967) for the idea that the Utah Supreme Court has rejected an "enhancement of 
value" interpretation of "improvement" is without context, both as to Frehner and 
on the whole. Timberline fails to note that the language it quotes was not the 
Frehner Court's own language, but was quoted by the Frehner Court before it 
distinguished that quoted case. Id. at 449. Most importantly, both Frehner and 
the quoted case were decided prior to the 1973 amendments. 
Next, Timberline claims that The Flood Co/s broad interpretation of 
"improvement" would make the words "construction" and "alteration" 
superfluous because they would always result in an "improvement." Not so, for 
as Timberline mentions Lord Tenterden's rule elsewhere, it is worth noting that 
this rule would read "improvement" in connection with "construction" and 
"alteration." Then, Timberline argues that the second category would entirely 
subsume the first. Not so, as the two categories are not coterminous in their 
reach. While the second category extends further in some situations by 
considering factors such as enhancement of value or habitability, the first 
category extends further in situations where construction may not be complete or 
where the parties dispute whether there is an enhancement of value. 
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Timberline also argues that there is nothing in the legislative history of the 
Mechanics7 Lien Act that would evidence a legislative intent to entitle those 
performing cleaning, maintenance or repairs to a mechanics7 lien. (Throughout 
this portion of Timberline7s brief, Timberline relegates the work performed by 
The Flood Co. to the category of "cleaning, maintenance, or repairs.77 This 
characterization is inconsistent with the record, which shows that The Flood 
Co/s serious mitigation efforts were more than simple "cleaning, maintenance, or 
repairs.77) But the legislative history actually supports the broadest interpretation 
of the scope of lienable work or services. While the 1973 amendment was initially 
introduced to include landscape contractors and nurserymen, it is interesting to 
note that the legislature did not just add landscape contractors and nurserymen 
as additional categories of lienable work as it initially set out to do. Instead, 
before passing the statute, the legislature broadened the description of lienable 
work sufficiently to include landscape contractors and nurserymen. By 
broadening the statute, the legislature intended for anyone who made any 
improvement to any premises in any manner to be entitled to a mechanics7 lien. 
Finally, without any citation or support for its statement, Timberline 
argues that the legislature "clearly intended to limit the scope of who is entitled 
to a mechanics7 lien. All Clean's interpretation of section 38-1-3 knows no 
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bounds/' As shown above, there is no support for the assertion or implication 
that Section 38-1-3 is subject to narrow construction. The power of the plain 
language of the statute may not be diluted, especially when the statute's 
interpretation must be consistent with its acknowledged purpose. 
Moreover, this interpretation does not eviscerate the statute, nor does it 
open the floodgates for lien claimants who have not done significant work on a 
property, because under the second statutory category, there must be a 
measurable enhancement of value. Nor is there any practical merit to the 
argument, because someone who performs nominal work (whether it qualifies 
under the mechanic's lien statute or not) but remains unpaid is not likely to seek 
a lien where the amount owed is not significant. The lien expense, higher filing 
fee in district court, and cost of discovery and trial are not economically justified. 
Of paramount consideration, Section 38-1-3 "shall be construed with a 
view to effect the objects of the provision and to promote justice." Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-2(3). It is well established that the object of the mechanic's lien 
statute is to protect those who have "added directly to the value of the property 
of another by their materials or labor." Colder Bros, 652 P.2d at 924 (citing cases).9 
9 Timberline cites First Sec. Mortg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919,922 (Utah 1981), for 
the proposition that "A lien creates an encumbrance on property that deprives 
the owner of his ability to convey clear title and impairs his credit." Timberline 
seems to imply that this is a countervailing principle which operates against 
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Therefore, enhancement of value is certainly a critical factor in determining 
entitlement to a lien. Timberline's interpretation of Section 38-1-3 provides little 
guidance as to the scope of lienable work and attempts to negate the overarching 
purpose of the mechanic's lien statutes, which is to protect those who have 
provided materials or services which added value to an owner's property. 
B. The Flood Co. is entitled to a lien for the work it performed on 
Timberline's property because the work certainly enhanced the 
value of the property and was necessary to make it habitable. 
In addressing the issue of entitlement to a lien, Timberline initially makes 
some assertions which deserve clarification. First, Timberline states that "All 
Clean bore the burden of proving that the "work" or "repair" performed by All 
Clean was used in a manner that entitled All Clean to a mechanics' lien." Brief of 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, pgs. 31-32. The Flood Co., however, did not need 
to prove the proper application of the law to the trial court; it simply needed to 
present the evidence of what work it performed. It was the trial court's role to 
determine whether that work entitled The Flood Co. to a mechanic's lien. 
Timberline goes on to state that "[T]he trial court's findings of fact make 
clear that All Clean failed to present evidence sufficient to establish exactly what 
liberal construction of the statute. In contrast, the quoted statement was made by 
the Court in reference to the statutory requirement that a lien claimant furnish a 
sworn statement as to the facts giving rise to a lien, thereby minimizing 
"[fjrivolous, unfounded, and inflated claims." Id. 
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"work" or "repair" was performed by All Clean on the building." Id. at 32. To 
the contrary, nothing in the findings of fact or conclusions of law indicates that 
the trial court thought that The Flood Co. failed to present evidence sufficient to 
establish what work was done by The Flood Co. Indeed, the trial court's 
conclusions of law indicate that it thought it had sufficient facts to rule as to 
whether The Flood Co. was entitled to a lien. The trial court denied the 
mechanic's lien claim because it believed "the work done by plaintiff is not of the 
type which entitles plaintiff to have a lien upon the property of defendants." (R. 
at 269). If the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to apply the law to the facts, it 
would have so stated, and would not have actually applied the law to the facts. 
This clarification is revealing, for it shows that if there is any challenge to 
the trial court's findings, it is actually made by Timberline, and not The Flood 
Co., in arguing that the trial court did not have sufficient facts upon which to rule 
that The Flood Co. was not entitled to a mechanic's lien. That was not the trial 
court's position. By contrast, The Flood Co. acknowledges that the trial court had 
the appropriate and necessary facts before it but argues that the trial court 
incorrectly applied the law to those facts.10 
10 The one citation from the trial record which Timberline believes shows that 
"the trial court did not believe that All Clean had established the exact nature of 
'the work' or 'the repairs,'" Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants, pg. 37, was 
actually not relevant to that issue. Mr. Olsen stated, in reference to numbers on 
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The trial court's findings of fact alone are sufficient to show that The Flood 
Co. was entitled to a lien. The Flood Co. was authorized to "perform flood 
remediation work" on Timberline's property, and was necessary to get the 
temporarily-vacated tenant back in the property. (R. at 267). The work enhanced 
the value of the property, which enhancement was not insignificant: $4,794.07. (R. 
at 267). Under the proper interpretation of Section 38-1-3, the trial court's factual 
findings require reversal of the trial court's legal conclusion as to the lienability of 
the work done by The Flood Co.11 
an estimate done by the insurance company, that "This represents the value that 
they put to the scope of work that was necessary and performed on this job and 
work their reimbursement would have been based on." (R. at 295, pg. 32) 
(emphasis added). The issue discussed was the value assigned by the insurance 
company, not the detail of work and services performed. Prior to this point in 
the trial, the evidence of the work and services performed had already been 
admitted, detailed, and discussed. (R. at 295, pgs. 15-18,23-30). The Flood Co/s 
Brief of the Appellant, pages 51-52, summarizes the evidence presented at trial. 
None of the evidence therein identified relied upon testimony from Mr. Olsen 
which lacked foundation. No contrary evidence of the nature of the work 
performed was presented by Timberline, and the trial court relied on this 
evidence in determining the reasonable value of the services. (R. at 295, pg. 79, 
lines 14-23). 
11 The Flood Co. raised the potential issue of remand in its Brief of the Appellant, 
page 21, but the trial court's findings of fact contain the crucial facts which 
should have caused the trial court to find a lien in favor of The Flood Co. If, 
however, this Court applies an alternate legal theory which requires additional 
fact finding, the question of the appropriateness of remand for additional 
findings could arise. See Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,999 (Utah 1987) (citation 
omitted). If so, The Flood Co. would not be required to marshal the evidence, but 
would simply point out the legal insufficiency of the trial court's findings. 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,477-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The evidence 
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Timberline's property was changed from being uninhabitable to being fit 
for its intended purpose. The work was necessary to make the premises 
habitable, as the trial court specifically found that the flood event had forced the 
evacuation of the tenant which occupied the property of Timberline. (R. at 267). 
Moisture was removed from the walls and floor and significant mold or bacterial 
damage was avoided. The trial court believed that the work of The Flood Co. 
had enhanced the value of Timberline's property. (R. at 295, pg. 79 lines 14-23). 
Again, it is Timberline who appears to challenge the evidence and the trial 
court's findings in its characterization of the work done by The Flood Co. as the 
" cleaning of a mess in a building/' and analogy to a housecleaner or snow 
remover. Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants, pgs. 40-41. According to the trial 
court's findings of fact, The Flood Co. did not just clean a mess, it performed 
flood remediation work which was essential in order to make the building 
habitable. The trial court also believed that The Flood Co/s work enhanced the 
value of Timberline's property. The Flood Co. did not simply perform routine 
maintenance, it mitigated a disaster which Timberline could not mitigate on its 
own and for which Timberline sought and obtained insurance coverage. 
A court's interpretation of Section 38-1-3 should facilitate the stated 
marshaled by The Flood Co. does show, however, that there is no conflicting 
evidence as to what work was done by The Flood Co. 
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objective of the statute. Division of the statute into two categories achieves that 
end. The Flood Co/s work is lienable under either category; of particular 
relevance here, however, is the second category, which aligns with the objective 
of the mechanic's lien statute in looking to whether the work performed 
enhanced the value of the property or was necessary to make the structures 
thereon habitable. The trial court believed that The Flood Co/s work both 
enhanced the value of Timberlirie's property and was necessary to make the 
commercial space habitable, but refused to recognize a lien in favor of The Flood 
Co. This refusal was contrary to the language of Section 38-1-3. 
III. TIMBERLINE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES. 
As detailed above, Timberline is not entitled to assert a claim for attorneys 
fees on appeal because it did not raise that issue in the trial court below. There 
was no opportunity to address or respond to that issue at trial. "It is indeed 
important that the issue be raised and that the parties have full opportunity to 
meet it." Palombi v.D&C Builders, 452 P.2d 325,328 (Utah 1969). 
Failure to raise the issue below makes this Court's review entirely 
theoretical. While an award under Section 38-1-18 to the successful party is 
mandatory, "successful party" status is not automatic. A.K. & R. \Nhxpiple 
Plumbing and Heating, 2004 UT 47, at |^f 7,26. That determination involves a 
"common sense" and "flexible and reasoned" approach. Id. at f 26. But what 
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the trial court would have done is entirely theoretical, as Timberline made no 
request. 
Even if Timberline had raised the issue below, it likely would not have 
been designated as the prevailing party. The Flood Co. prevailed on its unjust 
enrichment claim but not on claims of breach of contract, breach of duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, and enforcement of mechanic's lien. That said, The Flood 
Co. obtained the primary relief sought. Additionally, the trial court considered 
The Flood Co. as the prevailing party by awarding The Flood Co. its costs. See 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). In short, even if the request was before the trial court, it 
does not appear that the trial court would have concluded that Timberline was 
the "successful party/7 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, The Flood Co. respectfully requests reversal of the 
trial court's refusal to grant foreclosure of The Flood Co/s lien and that this Court 
also instruct the trial court on remand to award a reasonable attorneys fee 
appropriate under Section 38-1-18, along with costs and attorneys fees on appeal. 
rot" 
DATED and SIGNED this M_ day of February 2011. 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C 
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LEXSEE 2009 U.S. DIST LEXIS 17848 
TRACY RAWLINGS, Plaintiff, v. GELT EDGE FLOUR MILLS, INC., Defendant. 
CaseNo.l:07CV31DAK 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17848 
March 6,2009, Decided 
March 6, 2009, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: Rawlings v. Gilt Edge Flour Mills, 
Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84141 (D. Utah, Oct. 20, 
2008) 
COUNSEL: [*1] For Tracy Rawlings, Plaintiff: Bruce 
M. Franson, Robert H. Wilde, LEAD ATTORNEYS, 
ROBERT H. WILDE PC, MIDVALE, UT. 
For Gilt Edge Flour Mills, Defendant: Marty Eugene 
Moore, Wayne K. Caldwell, LEAD ATTORNEYS, 
BEARNSON & PECK LC, LOGAN, UT. 
JUDGES: DALE A. KIMBALL, United States District 
Judge. 
OPINION BY: DALE A. KIMBALL 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the court on Defendant Gilt 
Edge Flour Mills' Motion to Deposit Payment of Judg-
ment with Clerk or, in the Alternative, Order Mr. 
Rawlings to Accept Payment. Plaintiff has filed an oppo-
sition to Defendant's motion. Defendant, however, has 
not replied. Because the time for filing such reply has 
passed, the court took the motion under advisement. The 
court concludes that a hearing would not significantly aid 
in its determination of the motion. The court has folly 
considered the memoranda submitted by the parties as 
well as the facts and law relevant to the present motion. 
Accordingly, the court enters the following Memoran-
dum Decision and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
On July 2, 2008, Plaintiff received a jury verdict 
against Defendant in the amount of $ 18,472.00. The 
court entered Judgement in favor or Plaintiff for $ 
18,472.00 plus interest, but did not [*2] grant Plaintiffs 
request for attorney's fees. On October 28, 2008, Plaintiff 
appealed the court's ruling with respect to attorney's fees. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant seeks an order allowing it to deposit the 
judgment amount plus interest with the court pending 
Plaintiffs appeal. Plaintiff argues that this court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the present motion while the case is 
on appeal. Plaintiff also argues he should not be required 
to accept payment of the judgment amount because it has 
the potential to compromise his pending appeal and that 
Rule 67 is not an appropriate vehicle for the deposit of 
the judgment amount. Finally, Plaintiff disputes the 
amount Defendant seeks to pay. 
As a general rule, courts treat a notice of appeal as a 
transfer of jurisdiction from the district court to the cir-
cuit court. See Moore's Federal Practice §303.32[1]. 
The Supreme Court has stated that the filing of a notice 
of appeal "divests the district court of its control over 
those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs 
v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 
103 S. Ct. 400, 74 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1982). The district 
court's role pending appeal is limited to performing min-
isterial functions and preserving the status quo. [*3] 
Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165, 177, 42 
S Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed. 538 (1992) ("trial court may . . . 
preserve the status quo until decision by the appellate 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17848, * 
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court . . . [b]ut it may not finally adjudicate substantial 
rights directly involved in the appeal.") Circuit courts 
have also recognizes that there are exceptions to Griggs 
and that the divestiture of jurisdiction rule is not a per se 
rule because it is guided by concerns of efficiency. See, 
e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 251 (2d 
Cir. 1996), Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F. 2d 
90, 97 (3d Cir. 1988); Prater v. Commerce Equities Mgt 
Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4363, 2009 WL 172826, V 
(S.D. Tex. 2009) (identifying four exceptions recognized 
by Fifth Circuit). 
The court does not believe that a resolution of the 
present motion regarding Defendant's payment of the 
jury verdict impacts the attorney's fees that is currently 
on appeal. Plaintiff, however, argues that his acceptance 
of the judgment would impact his appeal. If a judgment 
is paid and voluntarily accepted, a judgment will be 
deemed satisfied and any appeal will be moot. Sierra 
Nevada Mill Co. v. Keith-O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 
P. 943 (1916). However, Plaintiff acknowledges that 
there are exceptions to this [*4] rule. "If a judgment is 
entered as to one part of a controversy, which is separate 
and distinct from another part, and the disposition of the 
latter cannot affect the disposition of the former, a party 
may accept the money or property to which he is entitled, 
and not be deemed to waive his right to appeal as to 
other independent claims which the court refused to 
grant." Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 
(1973). 
In this case, Plaintiff received a jury award for the 
judgment amount and sought attorneys fees from the 
court. The court determined that Plaintiffs claim did not 
entitle him to an award of attorneys' fees, and Plaintiff 
appealed the court's ruling with respect to attorneys' fees. 
The jury award and the court's ruling on attorneys' fees 
are distinct and separate issues. Nothing on appeal could 
alter the jury verdict. Plaintiff, however, asserts that the 
Judgment entered by the court crossed out Plaintiffs 
proposed language awarding attorneys fees and is thus 
part of what is being appealed. The court finds no sound 
basis for this assertion. The court issued a Memorandum 
Decision and Order analyzing and ruling on the attor-
neys' fees issue. The fact that the court crossed out lan-
guage [*5] in a proposed judgment does not mean that 
the judgment is what is being appealed. Crossing out the 
language merely deleted language. It did not give the 
language any significance. 
While the court does not believe that Plaintiffs ap-
peal would be compromised in any way if he accepted 
payment of the judgment amount from Defendant, there 
is no case law cited by either party that would require 
Plaintiff to accept payment. The court is not inclined to 
require a party to accept payment when there is no law 
cited that would require him to do so. In addition, the 
court does not believe that Rule 67 is intended for the 
purpose Defendant wishes to use it. The "[p]urpose of 
Rule 67 is to permit stakeholder in pending action, by 
simple preliminary motion, to deposit money in court for 
ultimate disposition, and thus avoid expense and delay of 
litigation." United States v. McDonald Grain & Seed 
Co., 135 F. Supp. 854 (D.N.D. 1955). Accordingly, the 
court denies Defendant's Motion to Deposit Payment of 
Judgment with Clerk or, in the Alternative, Order Mr. 
Rawlings to Accept Payment.. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2009. 
/s/Dale A. Kimball 
DALE A. KIMBALL 
United States District Judge 
